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THE USE OF PILOT FINANCING TO DEVELOP 
MANHATTAN’S FAR WEST SIDE 
Amy F. Cerciello* 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 19, 2005, the Bloomberg Administration revealed the details 
of a plan to transform Manhattan’s Far West Side.1  The plan authorizes the 
extension of the Number Seven subway line and the construction of new 
office space, housing, streets, and parks.2  The Bloomberg Administration 
intends to finance these public improvements outside of New York City’s 
capital budget.  A newly created local development corporation called the 
Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation will issue bonds backed by 
revenues that the new development is expected to generate.3
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2000, Yale University.  I 
would like to thank Professor Aaron Saiger for his helpful guidance on this Comment. 
  The largest 
 1. Press Release, N.Y. City Council, Miller and Council Members Announce Details of 
Far West Side Plan (Jan. 10, 2005), at 
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/newswire/1_10_05_west_side.pdf [hereinafter Miller 
and Council Members].  Manhattan’s Far West Side (also called the Hudson Yards) consists 
of “the area bounded by the south side of West Forty-third Street on the north, the east side 
of Eleventh Avenue on the west, generally, the north side of West Twenty-seventh Street 
and West Thirtieth Street on the south, and the west side of Seventh and Eighth Avenues on 
the east.”  Press Release, City of N.Y. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, New York City 
Announces Lead Underwriters for Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (Feb. 11, 
2004), at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/omb/pdf/press02_04a.pdf [hereinafter New York City 
Announces Lead Underwriters]. 
 2. New York City Announces Lead Underwriters, supra note 1.  The Bloomberg 
Administration concurrently planned to expand the Jacob K. Javits Center (“Javits Center”) 
and construct a new stadium for the New York Jets.  Id.  After New York City lost its bid to 
host the 2012 Olympic Games, however, the stadium project was tabled.  See, e.g., 
CharlesV. Bagli, Schumer Calls for Action on Two West Side Development Plans, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2005, at B4 (citing “the collapse of the stadium project in Manhattan”).  
The City may still go ahead with the Javits expansion, but that project would be financed 
separately from the Hudson Yards development, and therefore I do not discuss it.  See id. 
(noting that U.S. Senator Charles Schumer called “for New York City to move ahead 
swiftly” on the Javits Center expansion); see also THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP. 
BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE FINANCING’S COMPLEX, $1.3BN STORY 13 n.2 (2004), at 
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY]. 
 3. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text. 
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anticipated revenue source for bond repayment is commercial payments in 
lieu of taxes (“PILOTs”) made by private developers who build within the 
development zone.4
PILOT-backed bonds are a unique and little used mode of financing.  
New York City has never issued PILOT-backed bonds before,
 
5 and they 
are a rare structure in the municipal debt markets.6  Yet, PILOT financing 
has a close analog: tax increment financing (“TIF”).  TIF is a popular local 
redevelopment financing mechanism.7  Since its inception in California in 
1952, all fifty states have implemented legislation authorizing the use of 
TIF.8
I. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: THE BASICS 
  This Comment discusses TIF and its legal and financial drawbacks, 
and then applies the lessons learned from TIF to PILOT financing.  Part I 
describes TIF’s general structure and underlying rationale and then 
examines New York State’s TIF statute.  Part II considers the legal 
challenges that have been raised against TIF and predicts their likely 
outcome in a New York court.  Part III explores the risks and policy 
considerations surrounding the use of TIF.  It also considers whether TIF 
really is a self-financing redevelopment mechanism, as its proponents 
argue.  Finally, Part IV examines the limited use of TIF in New York and 
proposes an explanation for its scarcity.  It also outlines the similarities 
between TIF and PILOT financing, and explains how the legal issues, risks, 
and policy considerations surrounding the use of TIF apply with equal 
force to PILOTs.  It concludes by recommending some changes to the Far 
West Side’s PILOT financing plan, based on the lessons learned from TIF. 
This section begins by explaining the basic structure of TIF—in 
particular, how tax revenues get allocated during the life of a TIF project.  
It then describes TIF’s basic assumptions and underlying rationale.  
Finally, it examines New York State’s TIF statute. 
 
 4. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 5. Michael McDonald, N.Y.C. Sees $2.7B in West Side Bonds, BOND BUYER, Feb. 12, 
2004, at 44 [hereinafter McDonald, West Side Bonds]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Joyce A. Man, Introduction, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 1 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 
2001).  By 1992, over 5,400 municipalities in forty-four states had used TIF.  Jeffrey 
Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998).  As of 
2001, fifty-six percent of cities with populations over 100,000 had used TIF.  J. Drew 
Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 15, 18 (Craig L. 
Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
 8. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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A. Tax Increment Financing’s Structure and Rationale 
TIF allows local governments to finance development projects with the 
increased tax revenue generated by the redeveloped property.9  The initial 
property tax base of the redevelopment zone (the “TIF district”) is “frozen” 
on the tax roll.10  As the redevelopment progresses, property values and 
property tax collections should increase.11  The taxing authorities continue 
to receive tax revenue based on the frozen base value,12 while the excess 
tax collections (the “tax increment”) flow into a special fund that is used to 
make interest and principal payments on the TIF bonds.13  The original 
taxing authorities do not get any of the tax increment until the TIF bonds 
are repaid.14
Two central assumptions underlie the use of TIF.  The first assumption 
is that property values would remain constant without the stimulation 
provided by TIF.
 
15  The second assumption is that the redevelopment 
causes the increase in property values and the corresponding increase in tax 
revenue.16
Because TIF projects are financed from the incremental tax revenue 
generated by the redevelopment, TIF proponents argue that TIF is a self-
 
 
 9. See, e.g., Sam Casella, What is TIF?, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 1 (James 
Hecimovich ed., 1985); Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment 
Financing and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 162 (1998) 
(“The driving force behind tax increment financing is the premise that the public will benefit 
from the increases in tax revenue created by the redeveloped property.”); Gary P. Winter, 
Tax Increment Financing: A Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism for NY 
Municipalities, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655, 655 (1991) (noting that TIF “exploits the rise in 
economic value and hence the increase in tax receipts which accompanies urban 
redevelopment”); Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment 
Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 458 (1996). 
 10. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 183; Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment 
Financing as a Tool for Community Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405, 410 (1978-
79); Randall V. Reece & M. Duane Coyle, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax 
Increment Financing, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 536, 538 (1979-80). 
 11. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 183. 
 12. See, e.g., id.; Davidson, supra note 10, at 410; Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 
538. 
 13. E.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 538.  The “tax increment” represents the 
difference between “the assessment based on the frozen base value and the amount of tax 
levied on the current value of the improved property.”  Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 9, at 163-64 (“Until the costs incurred by the 
redevelopment agency are repaid through the tax increment, all public entities that normally 
receive tax revenue from the property within the project area are limited to revenue based on 
the frozen valuation.”). 
 15. See Davidson, supra note 10, at 410. 
 16. Id. 
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financing mechanism.17  In theory, the municipality does not have to 
pledge funds from its capital budget or increase taxes to fund the 
development.18  This characteristic of TIF helps explain its increasing 
popularity.19
B. New York State’s Tax Increment Financing Statute 
 
TIF originated in California in 1952 as a way to provide local matching 
funds for federal urban renewal grants.20  Now all fifty states have 
legislation authorizing the use of TIF.21  New York authorized the use of 
TIF in 1984 with the passage of the Municipal Redevelopment Law ( “TIF 
statute”).22
 
 17. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 
 
7, at 184 (“What seemingly has occurred is that the 
redevelopment activities have become self-financing: the increment in land value generates 
the revenue to pay for the debt that was used to finance the expenditures that helped to cause 
the increment in land value.”); Neil deMause, Scrounging Up $3 Billion in ‘New’ Tax 
Money? Hey, No Problem, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 22, 2003 [hereinafter deMause, 
Scrounging] (“The promise of TIFs is no less than magical: to generate millions of dollars in 
subsidies for private developers, without costing the local government a dime.”).  See infra 
Part III.E for an analysis of whether TIF really is a self-financing mechanism as its 
proponents argue. 
 18. See, e.g., Joyce Y. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax 
Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, 
STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 93 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001); Reece & 
Coyle, supra note 10, at 540. 
 19. See, e.g., Casella, supra note 9, at 1; deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17 (“TIFs are 
the fastest-growing development subsidy . . . [because] they supposedly neither require new 
taxes nor the use of existing ones.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 17. 
 21. By 1997, forty-eight states had passed laws authorizing the use of TIF; only 
Delaware and North Carolina did not have TIF statutes.  Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. 
Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 31 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce 
Y. Man eds., 2001).  Delaware’s TIF statute (called the Municipal Tax Increment Financing 
Act), codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1701-1715, became effective in 2003.  North 
Carolina finally followed suit in November 2004, when voters approved a constitutional 
amendment authorizing the use of TIF and the issuance of TIF debt.  See Richard Rubin, 
Amendment 1: A New Tool, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 13, 2004, at B1.  North Carolina’s 
TIF statute (called the Project Development Financing Act) is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 159-101 to 159-113.  For a discussion of North Carolina’s TIF legislation, see P. Michael 
Juby, Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: The Myth of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1526 (2005). 
 22. In November 1983, the New York Constitution was amended to authorize the use of 
TIF.  N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.  New York’s TIF statute is codified at N.Y. GEN. MUN. 
LAW §§ 970-a to 970-q (McKinney 2005). 
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1. The Blight and “Cannot be Accomplished by Private Enterprise Alone” 
Requirements 
Under New York’s TIF statute, two criteria must be met before a 
municipality can implement a TIF project.  First, TIF can only be used to 
redevelop “blighted areas.”23  Second, TIF can only be used when “the 
redevelopment of such areas cannot be accomplished by private enterprise 
alone.”24  Most states’ TIF statutes contain similar requirements.25
2. The Planning Phase 
 
After the local legislature identifies a blighted area, it must conduct a 
study to determine the feasibility of the proposed redevelopment.26  If the 
legislative body concludes that the project is feasible, the next step is to 
prepare a preliminary plan that justifies the project.27  The plan must 
describe the project and its likely impact on the surrounding neighborhoods 
and the environment.28  It also must explain why redevelopment would not 
occur without TIF.29
If the legislative body approves the preliminary plan, it then must 
prepare a redevelopment plan.
 
30
 
 23. § 970-b.  Section 970-c(a) defines a “blighted area” as: 
  In addition to confirming the information 
an area within a municipality in which one or more of the following conditions 
exist: (i) a predominance of buildings and structures which are deteriorated or 
unfit or unsafe for use or occupancy; or (ii) a predominance of economically 
unproductive lands, buildings or structures, the redevelopment of which is needed 
to prevent further deterioration which would jeopardize the economic well being 
of the people. 
This vague definition gives local officials considerable discretion in identifying “blighted 
areas.”  THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, LEARNING FROM 
EXPERIENCE: A PRIMER ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 2 (2002), at 
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, PRIMER].  New York’s TIF statute is not 
unique; most states’ TIF statutes lack any quantifiable criteria for identifying blight.  See 
Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive 
Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 320 (2004).  As a result, municipalities and 
redevelopment agencies “have enjoyed wide latitude in defining or determining blight.”  Id. 
 24. § 970-b. 
 25. E.g., Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for 
Blight and But-For To Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1020 (2001) (these two requirements 
are “the principal tests required of any municipality to proceed with the use of TIF on a 
redevelopment initiative”). 
 26. § 970-d.  Although the legislative body ultimately designates the survey area by 
resolution, any person, group, association or corporation may request the designation of a 
particular area.  Id. 
 27. § 970-e. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. § 970-f. 
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provided in the preliminary plan, the redevelopment plan must describe the 
proposed method of financing.31  If the redevelopment will be funded with 
TIF bonds, then the plan must indicate the amount and term of the bonds 
that will be issued.32  The legislature then must submit the redevelopment 
plan to the planning agency for review.33  The planning agency is expected 
to file its comments within thirty days of receiving the plan.34
3. Public Hearing Requirement 
 
Before adopting the redevelopment plan, the legislative body must 
present the plan at a public hearing.35  It must post notice of the hearing in 
a local newspaper and in at least four prominent public locations in the 
affected area at least three weeks prior to the hearing.36  The notice must 
include a legal description of the boundaries of the project area and a 
summary of the plan.37
Anyone who objects to the proposed plan may challenge it at the public 
hearing.
 
38  The TIF statute requires the legislative body to “hear and 
consider” all objections.39  After the hearing, the legislative body may 
officially adopt the redevelopment plan.40
The legislative body may amend the redevelopment plan at any time 
after it is adopted.
 
41  But the amendments must go through the 
aforementioned public notice and hearing process before the legislature can 
adopt them.42
4. Implementation 
 
After the legislature adopts the redevelopment plan, the municipality has 
the authority to acquire property, relocate displaced individuals, demolish 
or move buildings, and prepare the site for redevelopment.43
 
 31. Id. 
  The statute 
 32. Id. 
 33. § 970-g. 
 34. Id. 
 35. § 970-h(a).  The legislative body must hold additional public hearings on a biennial 
basis to review and evaluate the progress of the TIF project.  Id. 
 36. § 970-h(b). 
 37. Id. 
 38. § 970-h(c). 
 39. § 970-h(d). 
 40. § 970-h(f). 
 41. § 970-m. 
 42. Id. 
 43. §§ 970-i to 970-l. 
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permits the municipality to assign these administrative powers to a local 
government agency.44
5. Tax Increment Bonds 
 
To carry out the redevelopment plan, the TIF statute authorizes the 
municipality to issue bonds payable from and secured by real property 
taxes (“TIF bonds”).45  The municipality can only issue TIF bonds for 
certain public purposes, however, including the acquisition of land, the 
demolition and removal of structures, and the construction of streets, 
walkways, public utilities, parks, and playgrounds.46  The statute expressly 
provides that TIF bonds may not be secured by the “faith and credit” of the 
local government47 and that they will not count toward the issuing 
municipality’s constitutional debt limitation.48
II. SUCCESSFUL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO TIF STATUTES 
 
Although no one has challenged New York’s TIF statute thus far, a 
number of constitutional arguments have been raised against other states’ 
TIF statutes. 49  Of those, three have prevailed.50
 
 44. Id.  Most TIF statutes permit a municipality to exercise redevelopment powers either 
directly or through a redevelopment agency.  See Casella, supra note 
  This section examines 
9, at 3. 
 45. § 970-o(a). 
 46. § 970-o(i). 
 47. § 970-o(b). 
 48. § 970-o(g). 
 49. The majority of courts considering TIF have found the TIF statutes constitutional 
against a variety of challenges.  See, e.g., Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 
1374 (Colo. 1980) (TIF does not violate constitutional debt limitations, constitutional 
prohibition against pledging of credit, or state constitutional prohibitions of nonuniform 
taxation); City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980) (TIF does not violate public 
purpose doctrine or uniformity clause); S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 
N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981) (TIF does not violate equal protection, due process, uniform and 
equal taxation requirement, constitutional debt limitations, or constitutional provision 
prohibiting laws that impair contracts); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 
(Iowa 1975) (TIF upheld against attacks relating to due process, equal protection, 
constitutional debt limitations, and delegation of legislative authority); State ex rel. Tomasic 
v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte County, 962 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1998) (TIF does not violate 
public purpose doctrine, equal protection, or constitutional debt limitations); State ex rel. 
Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 (Kan. 1980) (TIF does not violate uniform and 
equal taxation requirement and is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power); Delogu 
v. Maine, 720 A.2d 1153 (Me. 1998) (TIF does not violate public purpose doctrine or equal 
taxation requirement); Request for Advisory Opinion on the Constitutionality of 1986 PA 
281, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988) (TIF does not unconstitutionally lend the credit of the 
state or municipality); R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978) 
(TIF does not violate public purpose doctrine); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 
1980) (TIF does not constitute unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Meierhenry 
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those three arguments and predicts the likely outcome if they are ever 
raised in a New York court. 
A. TIF Bonds and Constitutional Debt Limits 
1. Generally 
All state constitutions limit the amount of public debt that municipalities 
can incur.51
Courts in the following states have considered the issue and concluded 
that TIF debt is subject to constitutional debt limitations: Arizona, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
  Courts are divided over whether TIF debt counts toward these 
limits. 
52  
With the exception of South Dakota, each of these states’ TIF statutes 
expressly provides that TIF debt does not count toward constitutional debt 
limitations.53
 
v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984) (TIF does not violate equal protection or due 
process guarantees, public purpose doctrine, state constitutional prohibition of nonuniform 
taxation, or constitutional provision prohibiting laws that impair contracts); Metro. Dev. & 
Hous. Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979) (TIF does not constitute an 
unconstitutional diversion of taxes and does not amount to an unconstitutional taking of 
property); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975) (TIF upheld against 
constitutional challenges regarding debt limitations). 
  Yet such provisions are not controlling.  According to the 
 50. See infra Parts II.A-C. 
 51. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 389 (rev. 5th ed. 2003).  For example, New York’s Constitution imposes the 
following debt limits, measured as percentages of the average full valuation of taxable real 
estate in the municipality: 
(a) Nassau County, for county purposes, 10%; 
(b) any county, other than Nassau County, for county purposes, 7%; 
(c) New York City, for city purposes, 10%; 
(d) any city, other than New York City, with a population greater than 125,000 according to 
the latest federal census, for city purposes, 9%; 
(e) any city having with a population of less than 125,000 according to the latest federal 
census, for city purposes excluding education, 7%; 
(f) any town, for town purposes, 7%; and 
(g) any village for village purposes, 7%. 
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 
 52. City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239, 1244-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Richards, 
237 N.W.2d 48 at 65-66; Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976); 
Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth. v. Med. Tech. & Research Auth. of Okla., 4 P.3d 677, 684 
(Okla. 2000); Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 179; County Comm’n of Boone County v. Cooke, 
475 S.E.2d 483, 493 (W. Va. 1996); City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45, 55 (Wis. 
1992). 
 53. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 45-47.  South Dakota’s TIF statute does not 
address the issue.  Id. at 47. 
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Oklahoma Supreme Court, “[s]tatutory declarations alone will not alter the 
nature of indebtedness when circumstances make it clear that an obligation 
has been incurred.”54  Courts in the aforementioned states reasoned that, 
because TIF bonds are repaid from property tax revenue, they implicate the 
credit of the underlying municipality.  For example, in Richards v. 
Muscatine,55 the Iowa Supreme Court held that “ultimately the ‘credit’ of a 
city is its power to levy general taxes.  When it pledges all or part of that 
power, it pledges its credit and in a realistic sense incurs an obligation.”56  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that TIF bonds 
count against constitutional debt limits because “they are payable solely 
from general property tax revenue.”57  The court noted that it did not matter 
that the tax increment might not have existed without the use of TIF.58
Courts in the following states have taken the opposite view, instead 
finding that TIF debt is not subject to constitutional debt limitations: 
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, and Utah.
 
59  In 
making this determination, these courts relied on the special fund 
doctrine.60  Under the special fund doctrine, when bonds are repaid from 
“special funds” rather than from a municipality’s general fund, those bonds  
do not count toward the municipality’s constitutional debt limitation.61 
With TIF projects, the special funds contain the increased tax revenue 
generated by the projects.  In Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court noted that TIF debt is repaid from a special 
fund containing the incremental property tax revenue from the TIF 
district.62
 
 54. Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth., 4 P.3d at 686; accord Kirley, 493 N.W.2d at 50 
(“The legislature’s characterization of the bonds is not controlling on this court’s 
determination of the constitutional issue.”); Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 178 
(“[N]otwithstanding the legislature’s characterization of the bonds, we must determine the 
nature of the bonding transaction from what it is, and not from what it is called.”). 
  The court reasoned that, since TIF bondholders cannot look 
 55. 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975). 
 56. Id. at 64. 
 57. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d at 54. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Colo. 1980); State 
v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 899 (Fla. 1980); S. Bend Pub. Transp. 
Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. 1981); Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n v. 
J.E. Dunn Const., 781 S.W.2d 70, 77 (Mo. 1989); Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, 
336 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1985); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 
1975). 
 60. See Julie A Goshorn, Note, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing 
Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 937 n.94 (1999) (describing how the special fund doctrine is 
used to avoid counting TIF bonds toward constitutional debt limits). 
 61. See  MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 404. 
 62. 336 S.E.2d at 874. 
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beyond this special fund for repayment, TIF bonds do not count toward 
constitutional debt limitations.63  The Supreme Court of Florida exercised 
similar reasoning in State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency.64  The 
court emphasized that if the special fund did not contain sufficient revenues 
to meet the bond obligations, TIF bondholders would have no recourse 
against the municipality.65  The court thus concluded that TIF debt should 
not count toward the municipality’s constitutional debt limitation.66
The application of the special fund doctrine to TIF is problematic.  The 
money funneled into these special funds is property tax revenue; “the 
character of [the] revenue does not change.”
 
67
Clearly the urban renewal bonds would constitute a constitutional debt if 
they were payable from the general revenues of the city without 
limitation.  We think the result is not different because [the TIF statute] 
carves out a certain portion of a city’s general revenues and limits the 
liability of the city to those revenues.  If the result were otherwise, a city 
could divide its general revenues into several special funds, each with a 
bond issue restricted to recourse against its own fund—and thus commit 
large portions of the city’s revenues without regard to [the constitutional 
debt limitation, which] could thus be virtually nullified.
  The Iowa Supreme Court 
best explained the conflict that arises when the special fund doctrine is used 
to exclude TIF debt from constitutional debt limitations: 
68
The court realized that allowing the special fund argument to prevail would 
perpetuate the creation of other special funds, resulting in the ongoing 
circumvention of constitutional debt limits.  It is true that counting TIF debt 
toward the underlying municipality’s debt limit may preclude valuable 
redevelopment projects.  But the purpose of constitutional debt limitations 
is “to prevent the creation of excessive municipal debt and to protect 
taxpayers from the consequent oppression of burdensome, if not ruinous, 
taxation.”
 
69
2. Likely Outcome in New York 
  Thus, although some redevelopment may not get 
accomplished, TIF debt should count toward constitutional debt limitations.  
This best serves the long-term interests of the taxpayers. 
New York’s TIF statute expressly states that TIF debt does not count 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1980). 
 65. Id. at 898. 
 66. Id. at 898-99. 
 67. Goshorn, supra note 60, at 943. 
 68. Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 64 (Iowa 1975). 
 69. City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Wis. 1992). 
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toward the issuing municipality’s constitutional debt limit.70  As shown 
above, such provisions are not controlling.71  But New York’s TIF statute 
was enacted pursuant to an amendment to the New York Constitution that 
also expressly provides that TIF debt does not count toward constitutional 
debt limits.72  This has been the deciding factor for courts in other states.  
For example, in finding that TIF bonds do not count toward constitutional 
debt limits, the South Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that the state 
constitution explicitly authorizes the issuance of such bonds.73  Conversely, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that TIF bonds do count toward 
Oklahoma’s constitutional debt limits, reasoning that Oklahoma’s enabling 
amendment “contains no language impacting or altering” these limits.74
B. Unlawful Diversion of School Tax Revenues 
  
Given the express language of New York’s enabling amendment, a New 
York court is not likely to find that TIF debt is subject to the constitutional 
debt limitations. 
1. Generally 
The diversion of property tax revenue to a TIF project can have a 
detrimental financial impact on overlapping jurisdictions.  In particular, 
school districts are often affected because they generally receive large 
amounts of property tax revenue.75  As such, several state courts have 
considered whether TIF unconstitutionally diverts tax revenue from school 
districts.76
 
 70. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o(g) (McKinney 2005). 
  Thus far, only courts in Kentucky and Washington have 
 71. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 72. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.  The amendment provides that “the amount of any 
indebtedness contracted under this section may be excluded in ascertaining the power of 
such county, city, town or village to contract indebtedness within the provisions of this 
constitution relating thereto.”  Id. 
 73. Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1985).  South 
Carolina’s enabling amendment authorizes the issuance of TIF bonds but does not address 
whether they will be subject to constitutional debt limits.  S.C. CONST. art. X, §14(10).  In 
contrast, New York’s enabling amendment specifically provides that TIF debt will not be 
subject to those limits.  N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. 
 74. Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth. v. Med. Tech. & Research Auth. of Okla., 4 P.3d 
677, 685 (Okla. 2000).  Cf. County Comm’n of Boone County v. Cooke, 475 S.E.2d 483, 
492 n.16 (W. Va. 1996) (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 75. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 49. 
 76. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 248-49 (Ill. 1980); Miller v. 
Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976); Request for Advisory Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 422 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Mich. 1988); City of El Paso v. El 
Paso Cmty. Coll., 729 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. 1986); Leonard v. City of Spokane, 897 P.2d 
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endorsed this argument.77  Unlike other states, Kentucky and Washington 
have special constitutional provisions that expressly prohibit the use of 
school tax revenue for non-school purposes.78  In Miller v. Covington 
Development Authority, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s 
TIF statute violated this provision of the Kentucky Constitution.79  The 
court rejected the argument that, because the incremental revenue would 
not have been raised without TIF, TIF was not diverting revenue that 
belonged to the school district.80  The court was equally unmoved by the 
argument that the use of TIF would eventually increase the school district’s 
tax revenue by increasing its tax base.81  The Washington Supreme Court, 
citing Miller, reached the same conclusion in Leonard v. City of Spokane.82
The specificity of Kentucky’s and Washington’s constitutional 
provisions regarding the use of school tax revenue limits Miller’s and 
Leonard’s applicability to other jurisdictions.
 
83
 
358, 361-62 (Wash. 1995). 
  Such provisions are not 
common features of most states’ constitutions.  For example, in City of 
Canton v. Crouch, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that our 
constitution provides for no such limitation on education revenues, and in 
fact encourages intergovernmental cooperation, compels us to reach the 
 77. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 5; Leonard, 897 P.2d at 361-62. 
 78. See KY. CONST. § 186; WASH. CONST. art 9, § 2.  Section 186 of the Kentucky 
Constitution states: 
All funds accruing to the school fund shall be used for the maintenance of the 
public schools of the Commonwealth, and for no other purpose, and the General 
Assembly shall by general law prescribe the manner of the distribution of the 
public school fund among the school districts and its use for public school 
purposes. 
KY. CONST. § 186.  Washington’s Constitution contains a similar provision: “the entire 
revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall 
be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.”  WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2. 
 79. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 5. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  The Kentucky legislature subsequently repealed Kentucky’s TIF statute in 1986.  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.750-.765.  It was replaced by the Kentucky Increment Financing 
Act in July 2000.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 65.680-.699.  The new statute remedies the 
constitutional problem identified in Miller by expressly prohibiting the use of tax revenue 
that would otherwise go to school districts.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.680. 
 82. 897 P.2d at 361 (holding that Washington’s TIF statute unconstitutionally diverted 
tax revenues from schools in violation of the state constitution). 
 83. See, e.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 547 (“In light of the unique character of 
the constitutional provision responsible for the demise of tax increment financing in 
Kentucky, the case should be of limited precedential value.”); Joseph F. Luther, Comment, 
Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, 1987 DET. C.L. 
REV. 89, 106-07 (1987) (“[T]he specificity of [Kentucky’s] constitutional provision may 
have the effect of limiting the applicability of this case to other jurisdictions.”). 
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conclusion that the decision in Miller has no application in this case.”84  
The Michigan Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Request for 
Advisory Opinion on the Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, holding that 
Miller did not apply because the Michigan Constitution does not contain a 
similar restriction on education revenues.85
2. Likely Outcome in New York 
 
School district taxes are not eligible for TIF bond repayment in New 
York.86  The constitutional amendment authorizing TIF legislation provides 
that only the municipality that initiates the TIF project can allocate its 
incremental tax revenue to a TIF fund.87  The enabling amendment does 
not authorize school districts to initiate TIF projects, which means that 
school districts cannot allocate their tax revenue to a TIF fund.88
C. Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power 
  
Therefore, the unlawful diversion of school tax revenue argument should 
not arise in New York. 
1. Generally 
Several courts have considered the legality of granting redevelopment 
agencies power over the tax revenue of other taxing jurisdictions.  Thus far, 
only one court has found that TIF permits an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority.89  In Miller v. Covington Development Authority, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated Kentucky’s TIF statute90
 
 84. 403 N.E.2d 242, 248-49 (Ill. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of Illinois’ TIF 
statute). 
 because it 
 85. 422 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Mich. 1988). 
 86. See Winter, supra note 9, at 671-72. 
 87. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 provides: 
[a]ny county, city, town or village contracting indebtedness pursuant to this 
section for redevelopment of an economically unproductive, blighted or 
deteriorated area shall pledge to the payment thereof that portion of the taxes 
raised by it on real estate in such area which, in any year, is attributed to the 
increase in value of taxable real estate resulting from such redevelopment. 
 88. Id.  New York’s TIF statute also prohibits the use of school district taxes.  The 
statute authorizes the use of “real property taxes levied upon taxable real property in the 
project area each year by or for the benefit of the municipality or municipalities” that 
approved the redevelopment plan.  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-p(a) (McKinney 2005).  
Section 970-c(e) defines a municipality as “a city, village, town or a county other than a 
county located wholly within a city.”  Since the definition of “municipality” does not 
include school districts, school district taxes cannot be allocated to the TIF fund. 
 89. Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky. 1976). 
 90. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.750-.770 (repealed 1986). 
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granted too much authority to independent redevelopment agencies.91  The 
court reasoned that legislative power should be exercised by elected 
representatives and not by administrative agencies.92  The court concluded 
that Kentucky’s TIF statute improperly delegated legislative power by 
permitting redevelopment agencies to create TIF districts without prior 
approval from the local governing body.93
Despite its success in Kentucky, all other courts that have heard the 
unlawful delegation argument have rejected it.
 
94  For example, in Tribe v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., the Utah Supreme Court determined that a 
redevelopment agency only offends the constitution when the agency has 
powers that “intrude into areas of purely municipal concern.”95  The court 
found that the state legislature has the authority “to grant [such an agency] 
any powers, not expressly prohibited by the constitution, to further such 
[state] purposes, including the power of taxation.”96  After characterizing 
the elimination of blight as a state concern, the court held that Utah’s TIF 
statute did not improperly delegate legislative power to a redevelopment 
agency.97  Similarly, in Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B v. 
Goldman,98 the California Supreme Court determined that a redevelopment 
agency is “entitled to exercise the powers delegated to it when functioning 
under the state law to fulfill the specifically enunciated state purposes.”99
 
 91. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 4-5.  The Miller Court invalidated Kentucky’s Tax Increment 
Act for two reasons, the first of which is discussed above.  See supra notes 
  
77-81 and 
accompanying text. 
 92. Miller, 539 S.W.2d at 4 (“If there is one essential characteristic inherent in 
legislative power, it is that such power must be exercised by an elected representative or 
representatives of the people, and not by a person, persons or agency created or designated 
by those representatives.”). 
 93. Id. at 2. 
 94. See Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B v. Goldman, 389 P.2d 538, 573 (Cal. 
1964); Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 124 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1954); Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1386 (Colo. 1980); S. 
Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 224-25 (Ind. 1981); Richards 
v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 56-57 (Iowa 1975); State ex rel. Schneider v. City of 
Topeka, 605 P.2d 556, 563 (Kan. 1980); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638, 640 (Nev. 
1980); Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171, 183 (S.D. 1984); Metro. Dev. & 
Hous. Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tenn. 1979); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
540 P.2d 499, 507 (Utah 1975). 
 95. Tribe, 540 P.2d at 503. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 389 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1964). 
 99. Id. at 571; accord Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 
124 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (noting that the state legislature “may, where necessary, 
confer authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the law; it may establish 
primary standards and impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative 
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The court concluded that, because elimination of blight is a specifically 
declared state purpose, California’s TIF statute did not unconstitutionally 
delegate legislative power to redevelopment agencies.100
2. Likely Outcome in New York 
 
New York’s TIF statute expressly defines the elimination of blight as a 
state goal: “it is declared to be the policy of the state to protect and promote 
the sound development and redevelopment of blighted areas.”101  The 
powers granted to redevelopment agencies by New York’s TIF statute are 
inexorably connected to this state objective.  Because a redevelopment 
agency that operates pursuant to New York’s TIF statute is furthering a 
state purpose, a New York court is likely to reject the unlawful delegation 
argument.  Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that, 
“[p]articularly [when a] statute concerns public financing programs, courts 
are required to exercise restraint and give deference to the legislative 
enactment.”102
III. RISKS OF TIF 
  Thus, a New York court is likely to defer to the legislature 
and uphold the TIF statute in the face of an unlawful delegation of 
authority challenge. 
Although many TIF projects have been successful, there are several 
potential risks that a municipality should consider before implementing a 
TIF project.  This section describes these risks and then considers whether 
TIF really is a self-financing mechanism, as its proponents argue. 
A. Impact of TIF Debt on the Underlying Municipality 
TIF bonds are more expensive than general obligation bonds.103  Unlike 
general obligation debt, TIF debt is not backed by the “faith and credit” of 
the underlying municipality.104
 
policy in accordance with the general provisions of the act”) (quoting Belovsky v. 
Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 283 (Pa. 1947)). 
  Therefore, TIF debt is riskier than general 
 100. Bunker Hill, 389 P.2d at 573. 
 101. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-b (McKinney 2005). 
 102. Local Gov’t Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 813 N.E.2d 587, 
594 (N.Y. 2004). 
 103. See Craig L. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing, in TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 71, 
77 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001); George Lefcoe, When Governments 
Become Land Developers: Notes on the Public-Sector Experience in The Netherlands and 
California, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 253 (1978). 
 104. See DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 2.  New York’s TIF statute expressly 
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obligation debt and thus generally warrants a higher interest rate.105
Although TIF debt requires a higher interest rate than general obligation 
debt specifically because it is not backed by the underlying municipalities’ 
faith and credit,
 
106 underlying municipalities almost always prefer to bail 
out TIF bonds rather than allow them to default.107  Generally, when 
implementing a TIF project, the underlying municipality will create a 
redevelopment agency that is a “legally separate and distinct entit[y]” to 
issue TIF debt.108  The municipality is not legally required to make debt 
service payments if the agency fails to pay.109  If the municipality does not 
cure the agency’s default, however, the rating agencies may downgrade the 
municipality’s general obligation debt.110  For example, when the 
Englewood Urban Renewal Authority of Englewood, Colorado defaulted 
on a twenty-seven million dollar TIF bond issue, Moody’s downgraded 
Englewood’s general obligation debt rating.111  In its explanatory report, 
Moody’s cited the “inextricable financial links among the city, the 
authority and the city’s unwillingness to follow through on its capital 
projects, regardless of how the debt that financed the project is ultimately 
secured.”112  Because of the risk to the municipality’s credit rating, the 
municipality has tremendous incentive to bail out TIF bonds.113  According 
to Economic Research Associates, when TIF bonds have come close to 
default, most local governments have provided the needed funds.114
 
provides that TIF bonds may not be secured by the “faith and credit” of the local 
government.  § 970-o(b). 
  
 105. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 103, at 77. 
 106. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
 107. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
 108. Johnson, supra note 103, at 81. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (“Nevertheless, the nonrepayment of TIF debt can have an adverse impact on 
the general government’s general obligation debt.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., GARY L. SULLIVAN ET AL., INSTIT. FOR POLICY & ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF 
TEX. AT EL PASO, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING BEST PRACTICES STUDY FOR GREATER EL 
PASO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 3 (2002), available at 
http://iped.utep.edu/IPED%20Reports/tr2002-10/tr2002-10.pdf. 
 114. DAVID A. WILCOX & DAVID E. VERSEL, ECON. RES. ASS’N, REVIEW OF BEST 
PRACTICES FOR TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999), available at 
http://www.econres.com/documents/issue_papers/issue_era_6_TIF_bestpractices.pdf; see 
also deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17 (“TIF bonds traditionally use a city’s general fund 
as a backup revenue source.”).  For example, in 1984 when two of Minneapolis’ TIF 
districts failed to generate sufficient revenue to repay their TIF debt, the city made up the 
difference.  See John Kemanski, Using Tax Increment Financing for Urban Development 
Projects, 4 ECON. DEV. Q. 23, 26 (1990). 
CERCIELLOCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:07 PM 
2005 PILOT FINANCING 117 
Default generally is “the option of last resort.”115
B. Revenue Shortfalls and Cost Overruns 
 
Before implementing a TIF project, a municipality needs to consider 
how difficult it is to estimate accurately project revenues and costs.  
Various factors can cause revenue shortfalls and cost overruns, and 
inaccurate predictions may, in turn, jeopardize the TIF debt.  First, the TIF 
project might not attract the projected level of private development.116  In 
addition, labor strikes, changes in market conditions, interest rate increases, 
and harsh weather conditions can halt or delay development.117  Second, 
assessed property values in a TIF district may decline rather than 
increase.118  In a TIF district in St. Petersburg, Florida, the taxable property 
value declined roughly twenty-five percent below its pre-TIF assessment 
due to recession.119  The city used existing taxes to bailout the project.120  
Third, tax abatements can reduce the tax base.121  When a municipality 
uses property tax abatements to attract developers, it risks lower-than-
anticipated tax increments if the abatements are not properly factored into 
the TIF projections.122  For example, taxable property values in some 
Michigan TIF districts declined from their base values because of the 
concurrent granting of tax abatements in those districts.123  Finally, some 
project costs are difficult to foresee.124  For example, Greenburgh, New 
York used eminent domain to displace some residents in its TIF district, 
and one of these residents sued over the price he received for his 
property.125  As a result of this unexpected litigation, Greenburgh 
accumulated sizeable legal costs that it had not factored into its 
projections.126
 
 115. Reinert, supra note 
 
25, at 1028. 
 116. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4. 
 117. See, e.g., Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 25; STANDARD & POOR’S, PUBLIC 
FINANCE CRITERIA 54 (2000) (on file with author). 
 118. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17. 
 121. See Klacik & Nunn, supra note 7, at 25. 
 122. Id.  For more information on the relationship between TIF and tax abatement, see 
infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text. 
 123. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 4. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
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C. Cost Spillovers 
The development associated with a TIF project is likely to generate 
increased demand for government services (such as education, fire, police, 
sanitation, and transportation) in the TIF district.127  The property taxes 
paid to the municipality by property owners in the TIF district likely will 
not cover the cost of these new services.128  And, the incremental tax 
revenue generated by the new development cannot be used to cover these 
costs.129  The redevelopment agency will continue to funnel the increment 
into a special fund until all the TIF bonds are retired—even if the increment 
is higher than expected.130  The local taxing bodies may wait many years 
before that portion of the tax base becomes available.  In the meantime, the 
municipality may have to increase taxes or dip into its general fund to pay 
for these services.131  As a result, taxpayers outside the TIF district often 
wind up subsidizing TIF projects.132
Some commentators argue that increased sales tax revenue from the new 
commercial growth in the TIF district will offset any indirect subsidies.
 
133  
This argument is flawed. Although the development may increase the 
supply of retail stores, it does not follow that the demand for retail goods 
will also increase.134  As such, there is no guarantee that sales tax revenue 
will increase to a point where it offsets contributions made by taxpayers 
outside the TIF district.  Commentators have also argued that as property 
values increase in the TIF district, adjacent landowners will experience a 
corresponding increase in property values that compensates them for their 
contributions to the TIF project.135  But it is almost impossible to determine 
when, where, and even whether such increase will occur.136
 
 127. E.g., Frank S. London, The Use of Tax Increment Financing to Attract Private 
Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 VA. TAX REV. 777, 809 (2001). 
  Moreover, if 
 128. Recall that, for the life of the TIF project, the original taxing authorities only receive 
taxes on the base assessed value of properties in the TIF district.  See supra notes 10-14 and 
accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that the original taxing authorities 
do not get any of the tax increment until the TIF bonds are repaid). 
 130. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  New York’s TIF statute provides that the 
tax increment does not revert to the municipality until all the TIF debt has been repaid.  
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-p(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005). 
 131. See, e.g., Michel, supra note 9, at 469. 
 132. DONALD G. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND 
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 187 (Supp. 1976). 
 133. See, e.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 542. 
 134. See Lefcoe, supra note 103, at 259. 
 135. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 542. 
 136. See David A. Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal – Redevelopment 
Incentive Without Federal Assistance, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 575, 578 (1973). 
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the use of TIF is not limited, it can extend indefinitely and thus never return 
the benefits to the taxpayers who subsidized the redevelopment.137
D. Lack of Voter Accountability 
 
TIF allows local governments to act without accountability to voters.138  
Most TIF statutes do not require voter approval prior to the adoption of the 
redevelopment plan or prior to the issuance of TIF bonds.139  Local 
governments essentially have free reign over TIF projects, which increases 
the likelihood of abuse.140
Powerful interests are now free to inveigh upon politically sensitive and 
possibly over-sold public officials to induce the expenditure of public 
funds in all sorts of development schemes, with no voter control but with 
voter liability if the development fails to produce the needed revenues 
and/or taxes to repay the bonds . . . .
  Chief Justice Henriod of the Utah Supreme 
Court best articulated the lack of voter accountability argument in his 
dissent in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.: 
141
Henriod points out that this freedom from voter approval may entice local 
officials to abuse TIF.  Because voter approval is not required, local 
officials can use taxpayers’ money for TIF “under almost any 
circumstance.”
 
142  Moreover, because TIF funds do not originate from the 
municipality’s capital budget, local officials have less incentive to review 
TIF expenditures as closely as they review budgetary items.143
TIF proponents argue that TIF statutes generally contain adequate 
safeguards to protect taxpayers from abuse.
  Taxpayers 
are disadvantaged by the lack of voting power because, as Henriod 
indicates, they are the ultimate repayers of the TIF debt if the project fails 
to produce the anticipated tax revenue. 
144
 
 137. See HAGMAN, supra note 
  In particular, some 
132, at 187. 
 138. E.g., Luther, supra note 83, at 117 (arguing that “[e]limination of voter 
accountability is the inherent defect in tax increment financing”). 
 139. See, e.g., Man, supra note 18, at 93.  For example, under New York’s TIF statute, 
the municipality must file an annual progress report with the State Comptroller, but voter 
approval is not required for project plans or bond issues.  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-q 
(McKinney 2005).  In contrast, most states have public referendum requirements for 
traditional general obligation debt.  See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 389. 
 140. See Luther, supra note 83, at 117. 
 141. 540 P.2d 499, 515 (Utah 1975) (Henriod, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Henriod 
also determined that “the taxpayers no longer have referendum control over the decisions of 
municipal bodies to extend money for capital improvements in any area which arbitrarily is 
labeled ‘blighted,’ whether it is blighted or not.”  Id. at 514. 
 142. London, supra note 127, at 810. 
 143. See Winter, supra note 9, at 682. 
 144. E.g., Reece & Coyle, supra note 10, at 541. 
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commentators argue that the public notice and hearing requirements 
contained in most TIF statutes ensure that the public has a voice in the TIF 
decision.145  In response, one critic rightly argues that “[p]ublic notice in a 
newspaper that a municipality is considering the implementation of tax 
increment financing is unlikely to raise the eyebrow of an attorney or 
accountant, much less the average public.”146  And even if taxpayers do 
take notice, the hearings themselves do not provide taxpayers with any real 
decision-making authority.147  Although taxpayers may challenge a TIF 
plan at a public hearing, the legislative body is not required to respond.  For 
example, New York’s TIF statute just requires the legislative body to “hear 
and consider” the public comments; the legislature does not have to make 
any changes to the redevelopment plan in response to public objection.148  
Another TIF proponent contends that the public hearings at least enable 
voters to make informed decisions about their elected officials at upcoming 
elections.149  But this overlooks the fact that many TIF projects are 
administered by redevelopment agencies consisting of officials who are 
appointed rather than elected.150  Elected officials effectively are protected 
against negative voter reaction to TIF projects.151  Thus, taxpayers 
essentially are left without a voice in the process.  Such a result seems 
unfair, given that taxpayers are the ultimate repayers of TIF debt.152
 
 145. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 
 
10, at 439; London, supra note 127, at 812.  Only 
seven states (Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio and Rhode 
Island) do not require public hearings prior to either plan approval or district creation.  Of 
the forty-eight states that had enacted TIF statutes by 1997, only six did not have public 
hearing requirements.  Johnson & Kriz, supra note 21, at 42.  Subsequently, the remaining 
two states, North Carolina and Delaware, passed TIF statutes.  See supra note 21.  North 
Carolina’s TIF statute requires the issuing municipality’s governing body to hold a public 
hearing before adopting the redevelopment plan.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.3 (2005).  
Delaware’s Municipal Tax Increment Financing Act, however, does not appear to require a 
public hearing.  DEL. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1701-1715 (2005). 
For a discussion of New York’s public hearing requirement, see supra notes 35-37 and 
accompanying text. 
 146. Luther, supra note 83, at 118. 
 147. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 10, at 440 (“If an issue does arise at this stage, it is 
likely to be treated as an administrative matter that does not require the same level of 
formalized citizen input.”). 
 148. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-h(d) (McKinney 2005). 
 149. London, supra note 127, at 812. 
 150. See HAGMAN, supra note 132, at 187; Kemanski, supra note 114, at 25 (noting that 
the creation of redevelopment agencies “raises the problem of accountability . . . in which 
decisions concerning millions of dollars are made by individuals who most often are not 
elected by voters”). 
 151. See Kemanski, supra note 114, at 25. 
 152. See Johnson, supra note 103, at 78. 
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E. Are TIF Projects Really Self-Financing? 
The argument that TIF is a self-financing redevelopment mechanism, 
often advanced by TIF supporters, is misleading.153  In reality, TIF projects 
often impose considerable costs on taxpayers.  If the anticipated tax 
revenue does not materialize, the underlying municipality likely will raise 
taxes or dip into its general fund to service and repay the TIF debt.154  
Moreover, an increased demand for city services often accompanies the 
redevelopment; thus, taxpayers outside the TIF district may be forced to 
pay higher taxes to cover the cost of these services.155  Finally, there is 
always some possibility that the development would have occurred without 
the use of TIF.156  If this is the case, then the tax increment also would have 
occurred—meaning that the original taxing authorities unnecessarily 
subsidized the redevelopment.157
Because many of TIF’s costs are “hidden and may occur years later,” 
taxpayers likely will not be able to discern the true costs of TIF projects.
 
158
IV. FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK 
  
When local officials praise TIF projects as self-financing, they mislead 
their constituents, giving them a false impression of TIF and its associated 
costs.  When a city’s general fund is ultimately responsible for the debt 
should the project fail, it is improper to assert otherwise.  Thus, local 
officials should stop billing TIF projects as self-financing.  Instead, they 
should provide accurate explanations of the pros and cons of TIF, so that 
their constituents can develop accurate opinions about its merits. 
This section considers TIF’s scarcity in New York and proposes a 
potential explanation.  It then describes the intended use of PILOT 
financing to develop Manhattan’s Far West Side.  It examines the structural 
and conceptual similarities between PILOT financing and TIF and explains 
how the legal issues and policy considerations surrounding the use of TIF 
apply with equal force to PILOT financing.  Finally, it applies the lessons 
learned from TIF to PILOT financing and, based on those lessons, 
recommends some changes to the PILOT financing of the Far West Side 
development. 
 
 153. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra Parts III.A-B. 
 155. For further discussion of these cost spillovers, see supra Part III.C. 
 156. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 188. 
 157. Id.  Yet “it is impossible to know what level of development would have occurred in 
the absence of TIF.”  Id. 
 158. Michel, supra note 9, at 469. 
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A. The Use of TIF in New York 
There are only two reported uses of TIF in all of New York thus far.159  
The town of Victor in Ontario County issued approximately eight million 
dollars in TIF bonds in 1994 to help finance the renovation and expansion 
of a local shopping mall,160 while the town of Greenburgh in Westchester 
County issued roughly $770,000 in TIF debt between 1990 and 1993 to 
fund road improvements.161
New York’s heavy reliance on tax abatement may explain its scant use 
of TIF.
 
162  Tax abatement programs attempt to attract private development 
by exempting developers from paying real property taxes for a certain 
number of years.163  In New York State, municipalities are authorized to 
grant tax abatements for up to twenty-five years for residential property.164
 
 159. Under section 970-q of New York’s TIF statute, a municipality employing TIF must 
submit an annual progress report to the State Comptroller.  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-q 
(McKinney 2005).  According to the Office of the State Comptroller, their records do not 
indicate that any other local government, besides Victor and Greenburgh, has filed a report 
pursuant to section 970-q.  Telephone Interview with Office of the State Comptroller (Feb. 
10, 2005). 
  
 160. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Dollard, Town Manager of Victor (Feb. 4, 
2005).  According to Dollard, the redevelopment boosted Victor’s economy; Victor’s sales 
tax revenue increased almost 270% in the wake of the mall project.  Id. 
 161. Telephone Interview with Doreen Muentener, Deputy Comptroller of Greenburgh 
(Feb. 10, 2005).  Greenburgh issued $660,500 in 1990, $135,000 in 1992, and $95,000 in 
1993.  Id.  For more information on Greenburgh’s TIF project, see supra notes 125-126 and 
accompanying text. 
 162. See Winter, supra note 9, at 693 (noting that “the traditionally indiscriminate use of 
tax abatements in New York may discourage municipalities and developers from even 
bothering with tax increment financing”). 
 163. E.g., Winter, supra note 9, at 691. 
 164. Section 421-a of New York’s Real Property Tax Law provides graded exemptions 
for newly constructed residential multiple dwellings (defined as three or more families 
living independently of one another).  N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 
2005).  The duration of the exemption ranges from ten to twenty-five years, based on project 
location and affordability.  Id.  Section 421-b provides an eight-year graded exemption for 
newly constructed or reconstructed one- and two-family homes.  § 421-b.  Section 421-c 
provides a graded exemption of up to ten years for new residential multiple dwellings in 
towns, villages, and cities with less than one million residents.  § 421-c.  Section 421-e 
provides a twenty-year graded exemption on cooperatives, condominiums, homesteading or 
rental projects that receive payments pursuant to Article 18 of the private housing finance 
law.  § 421-e.  New York City in particular runs an extensive tax abatement program.  E.g., 
Michael J. Wolkoff, The Nature of Property Tax Abatement Awards, 49 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 
77, 80 (1983).  According to the New York City Independent Budget Office (IBO), over the 
last five years approximately 1,200 units with ten-year exemptions and 1,300 units with 
twenty-year exemptions have been added annually.  N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, 
BUDGET OPTIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 56 (2005), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us.  The IBO 
estimates that the full cost in foregone property tax revenues is roughly $22,000 per unit 
with a ten-year exemption and $91,000 per unit with a twenty-year exemption.  Id. at 56.  
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Similar abatement schemes exist for non-residential property.165  Because 
TIF depends on new property tax revenue, it essentially precludes the use 
of tax abatement programs as incentives to attract private development.166  
If developers are given tax breaks, there will be less incremental tax 
revenue to collect.167
B. The Use of PILOT Financing in New York 
 
New York’s limited use of TIF is somewhat misleading, because the 
Bloomberg Administration recently initiated a substantial development 
project in New York City (“the City”) that uses PILOT financing, a close 
variant of TIF. 
1. Description of the Far West Side Development 
The development of Manhattan’s Far West Side will occur in two 
phases.168
 
Between 1971 and 2002, the 421-a exemption helped finance the construction of 87,000 
apartments in New York City.  N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, WORTH THE COST? 
EVALUATING THE 421-A PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 1 (2003), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us.  
The Department of Finance estimates that the use of the 421-a program in New York City 
resulted in $130 million in foregone tax revenue in 2002 alone.  Id. 
  Phase I calls for the extension of the Number Seven subway line 
from Times Square west to Eleventh Avenue; the construction of a 
platform over the Eastern Rail Yards; the formation of a new street system, 
including “Hudson Boulevard,” a mid-block street running north-south 
 165. Section 485-a of New York’s Real Property Tax Law provides for a twelve-year 
graded exemption for non-residential property converted to mixed-use property in a 
municipality with less than one million inhabitants.  § 485-a.  Section 485-b provides for a 
ten-year graded exemption on real property “constructed, altered, installed or improved . . . 
for the purpose of commercial, business or industrial activity.”  § 485-b. 
 166. HAGMAN, supra note 132, at 187. 
 167. TIF and property tax abatement programs have different benefits, which may 
explain why some municipalities prefer TIF and others prefer tax abatements.  One benefit 
of tax abatement programs is that the cost of the abatement is borne solely by the particular 
jurisdiction that gives the subsidy.  See Chapman, supra note 7, at 189.  In contrast, 
overlapping jurisdictions often bear some of the costs associated with TIF.  See supra Part 
III.C.  Tax abatement is also less complicated than TIF.  Winter, supra note 9, at 692.  The 
municipality does not have to designate a specific TIF district and divert incremental tax 
revenues to a special fund.  Some municipalities prefer TIF over tax abatement programs, 
however, because they believe that TIF is a self-financing mechanism that stimulates 
development without direct subsidies.  See Man, supra note 18, at 94. 
 168. See CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PRESENTATION OF HUDSON YARDS 
INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION FINANCING PLAN TO CITY PLANNING COMMISSION (July 12, 
2004), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/hyards/financing_for_cpc.pdf [hereinafter 
HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION]; see also COMM. ON FIN., N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF 
THE FINANCE DIVISION: PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005 (Jan. 19, 2005) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005]. 
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between Tenth and Eleventh Avenues from West Thirty-third Street to 
West Thirty-ninth Street; and the creation of a six-acre park over the 
Eastern Rail Yards Platform and a network of parks along the new Hudson 
Boulevard.169  Phase II consists of the construction of a subway station at 
Forty-first Street for the Number Seven line and the construction of the 
northern blocks of Hudson Boulevard.170  According to a report by the City 
Council’s Finance Division, Phase I will cost approximately $2.8 billion 
and Phase II will cost roughly $775 million.171
2. Financing the Far West Side Development 
 
The City initially considered using traditional TIF to finance the Far 
West Side development.  In 2001, the Department of City Planning 
published a report that outlined a comprehensive development plan and 
proposed the use of TIF.172  Subsequently, many groups, including the 
NYC2012 Olympic Committee, submitted proposals advocating the use of 
TIF.173  Although the City ultimately decided not to use “a classic TIF,” it 
is using a close variant that shares many of TIF’s conceptually important 
features.174
To finance Phase I, the Bloomberg Administration created the Hudson 
Yards Infrastructure Corporation (“HYIC”), a non-profit local development 
corporation.
 
175
 
 169. See HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 
  The HYIC will issue thirty-year bonds backed by revenue 
168. 
 170. See id. 
 171. PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168.  According to the 
report, Phase II can be deferred until future development produces the need and financial 
resources for the infrastructure.  Id. 
 172. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF N.Y., FAR WEST MIDTOWN: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 61 (2001), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/pub/fwmt.pdf. 
 173. DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 23, at 2; see also Michael McDonald, IBO Leery of 
N.Y. City TIF District, BOND BUYER, Mar. 13, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter McDonald, IBO 
Leery] (describing how the City initially planned to use TIF to pay for the Far West Side 
development). 
 174. McDonald, IBO Leery, supra note 173, at 1; see also Neil deMause, The Jets’ End 
Run, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 16, 2004, at 20 (remarking that “[t]he effect [of the Far West 
Side financing] would be exactly the same [as TIF]”); Matthew Strozier, How to Pay for the 
Far West Side, REAL DEAL, May 2004 (referring to the Far West Side financing as a “TIF-
style arrangement”). 
 175. The HYIC was created pursuant to section 1411 of New York’s Not-for-Profit 
Corporation Law, which authorizes the creation of local development corporations.  Section 
1411-a provides: 
Corporations may be incorporated or reincorporated under this section as not-for-
profit local development corporations operated for the exclusively charitable or 
public purposes of relieving and reducing unemployment, promoting and 
providing for additional and maximum employment, bettering and maintaining job 
opportunities, instructing or training individuals to improve or develop their 
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expected to be generated by the development.176  Payments in lieu of taxes 
(“PILOTs”) from new commercial buildings and residential property taxes 
together will provide more than eighty-five percent of the revenues.177  
Payments received from the sale of development rights over the Eastern 
Rail Yard and contributions to the District Improvement Fund (in exchange 
for development bonuses) will contribute roughly ten to twelve percent.178  
The remaining money will come from the sale of publicly-owned land and 
payments in lieu of sales taxes on construction materials.179
3. PILOT Financing: A TIF-Like Arrangement 
 
PILOTs made by private developers represent the primary source of 
expected revenue for the Far West Side development.  By 2015, PILOTs 
will contribute over forty percent of total revenue, and more than half of 
the total revenue is expected to come from PILOTs after 2020.180
The City has never issued bonds backed by payments in lieu of taxes 
before,
 
181 and they are a rare structure in the municipal debt markets.182
a. How Does PILOT Financing Work? 
  
But, PILOT financing is conceptually and structurally similar to TIF.  As a 
result, the legal issues, risks, and policy considerations surrounding the use 
of TIF apply with equal force to PILOT financing. 
Under the Far West Side plan, private developers planning to develop in 
 
capabilities for such jobs, carrying on scientific research for the purpose of aiding 
a community or geographic area by attracting new industry to the community or 
area or by encouraging the development of, or retention of, an industry in the 
community or area, and lessening the burdens of government and acting in the 
public interest. 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1411-a (McKinney 2005).  Section 1411-c authorizes 
local development corporations to borrow money and issue bonds.  §1411-c.  According to 
the IBO, “[a]lthough there are no explicit plans for financing Phase 2, the anticipated 
revenues are intended to ultimately cover all project costs, including Phase 2 financing.”  
DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 2. 
 176. See PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168.  The bonds will be 
issued from 2005 to 2011.  Id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id.; HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168. 
 179. See HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168. 
 180. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 4. 
 181. See McDonald, West Side Bonds, supra note 5.  But PILOTs (as opposed to PILOT-
backed bonds)  are not a new phenomenon.  New York City received roughly $209 million 
in PILOTs in 2004.  See COMM. ON FIN., N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE FINANCE 
DIVISION: PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005 (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005]. 
 182. Id. 
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the Hudson Yards will have the option of entering into PILOT agreements 
with the City’s Industrial Development Agency (“IDA”).183  Under these 
agreements, the IDA will purchase the land from the developers.184  This 
removes the land from the property tax rolls, because the IDA is a tax-
exempt entity.185  The developers will then make payments in lieu of 
regular property taxes to the IDA for the duration of the agreement.186  
These payments are generally less than the amount of real property taxes 
that would otherwise be due.187  Presumably, the IDA will funnel these 
payments into a special fund overseen by the HYIC.  The HYIC will then 
use the special fund to make interest and principal payments on the project 
bonds.  At the end of the contract period, the IDA will return the land to the 
developers and the developers thereafter will pay taxes to the City rather 
than making payments to the IDA.188
b. Structural Similarities Between PILOT Financing and TIF 
 
TIF and PILOT financing have the same basic structure.  Under both, a 
redevelopment agency issues bonds and uses the proceeds to finance public 
improvements.  The public improvements are expected to increase property 
values and generate new property tax revenue.189
 
 183. The IDA is a public benefit corporation created under section 917 of the New York 
General Municipal Law.  N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 917 (McKinney 2005).  Section 917 
provides: 
  Instead of going into the 
[i]t is the policy and intent of the City of New York to promote the economic 
welfare of its inhabitants and to actively promote, attract, encourage and develop 
economically sound commerce and industry through governmental action for the 
purpose of preventing unemployment and economic deterioration by the creation 
of a New York City Industrial Development Agency. 
Id. 
 184. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 3. 
 185. E.g., Joshua P. Rubin, Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and 
Relational Contracting, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277, 1303 n.162 (1995). 
 186. Id.  Section 854 (17) of New York’s General Municipal Law defines payments in 
lieu of taxes as “any payment made to an agency, or affected tax jurisdiction equal to the 
amount, or a portion of, real property taxes, or other taxes, which would have been levied by 
or on behalf of an affected jurisdiction if the project was not tax exempt by reason of agency 
involvement.”  § 854(17).  Section 858 authorizes the IDA to enter into PILOT agreements.  
§ 858.  The IBO believes that the PILOT agreements will have a thirty-year term.  DEVINE, 
COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 3. 
 187. PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 6 (PILOT financing uses “property 
tax revenue and the proceeds from the sale of new development rights that result from 
public investment in infrastructure to pay for the infrastructure”); see also supra note 11 and 
accompanying text (noting that public improvements should increase property values and 
property taxes) . 
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municipality’s general fund, this new tax revenue goes into a special 
fund.190  The redevelopment agency then uses the money in the special 
fund to service and repay the project debt.  In theory, neither TIF nor 
PILOT projects take money from the municipality’s general fund.191
Although similar, TIF and PILOT financing are not identical.  Under 
TIF, private developers own the project land, whereas under the West Side 
plan the IDA will own the land until the PILOT agreements expire.
 
192  
Moreover, with TIF, all incremental tax revenue from the TIF district flows 
into a special fund maintained by a redevelopment agency.193  In contrast, 
with the West Side’s PILOT financing, only payments made under PILOT 
agreements will go into a special fund.  All taxes collected on non-PILOT 
properties will continue to go to the City’s general fund.194
c. Potential Legal Challenges to PILOT Financing 
 
Given the similarities between TIF and PILOT financing, the PILOT 
financing of the Far West Side development could face some of the same 
legal challenges that TIF has already faced. 
i. PILOT Bonds and Constitutional Debt Limits 
The Bloomberg Administration does not intend to count the PILOT-
backed debt toward the City’s constitutional debt limit.195  As explained 
above, the PILOT bonds will be issued by the HYIC, a local development 
corporation created pursuant to section 1411 of New York’s Not-for-Profit 
Corporation Law.196
 
 190. See supra note 
  Section 1411 authorizes not-for-profit local 
development corporations like the HYIC to borrow money and issue 
13 and accompanying text (explaining that the tax increment 
collected from TIF projects flows into a special fund). 
 191. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of how TIF 
proponents argue that TIF projects are self-financing.  Similarly, proponents of the Far West 
Side financing plan argue that the project will pay for itself.  See, e.g., DIVINE, COMPLEX 
STORY, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that PILOT financing does not draw directly on general 
fund revenue); Charles V. Bagli, West Side Plan is Risky Effort, Forecasters Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Bagli, Risky Effort] (quoting Deputy Mayor Daniel 
Doctoroff as saying that the West Side development “pays for itself with new revenues it 
will generate—not with capital budget money”); Strozier, supra note 174 (describing the 
West Side project as “financially self-supporting”). 
 192. See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text (explaining how PILOT financing 
works). 
 193. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 194. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 12. 
 195. Id. at 6.  Under New York’s Constitution, New York City can only issue debt up to 
10% of its average full valuation of taxable real estate property.  N.Y. CONST. art VIII, § 4. 
 196. See supra note 175-176 and accompanying text. 
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bonds,197 but it does not address whether such bonds will be considered a 
debt of the underlying municipality.  The Far West Side plan, however, 
provides that interest payments on the HYIC debt may come from the 
City’s general fund.198
The Administration likely will rely on the special fund doctrine to 
support its position that the PILOT bonds do not count toward that limit.
  Given that the City has express authority to pay the 
interest on the debt, the debt should count toward the City’s constitutional 
debt limitation. 
199  
The application of the special fund doctrine to PILOT-backed bonds is 
problematic, just as it is with TIF bonds.200
Given that the PILOT bonds will be repaid from tax revenue, they 
should count toward the City’s constitutional debt limit. 
  If the IDA did not purchase the 
land from the developers (which removes the land from the property tax 
rolls), then the developers would still be paying property taxes to the City.  
Thus, even though the PILOTs will be funneled into a special fund, the 
fund will contain property tax revenue.  Because the special fund contains 
tax revenue, it implicates the City’s credit. 
ii. Unlawful Diversion of School Tax Revenues 
As with TIF projects,201 PILOT financing projects may divert tax 
revenue from school districts. The City’s school district is not an 
independent taxing jurisdiction.  Rather, it is fiscally dependent, meaning 
that it depends on tax revenue from the City’s general fund for support.202
iii. Unlawful Delegation of Authority 
  
Because the HYIC bonds will be repaid out of tax revenue that otherwise 
would go to the City’s general fund, the Far West Side’s PILOT financing 
has the potential to draw revenue away from City schools. 
The significant delegation issue under the Far West Side’s PILOT 
 
 197. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 2005). 
 198. See infra note 214. 
 199. For an explanation of the special fund doctrine, see supra note 61 and accompanying 
text. 
 200. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing the problem with using 
the special fund doctrine to avoid counting TIF debt toward constitutional debt limits). 
 201. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
 202. OFFICE OF MGMT. SERVS., N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, SCHOOL FINANCE IN NEW YORK 
STATE (1999), at http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Primer/primeintro.htm.  In New York 
State, all but five school districts are separate from municipal governments.  Id.  The 
exceptions are the five cities whose populations exceed 125,000: New York City, Buffalo, 
Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers.  Id.  In these five cities, education is part of the 
municipal budget.  Id. 
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financing plan concerns the Mayor’s intention to appropriate PILOTs 
without prior approval from the City Council.203  The Mayor unilaterally 
authorized the IDA to transfer the PILOTs to the HYIC .  This violates the 
City Charter, which requires the Mayor to seek legislative approval before 
appropriating public funds.204  This also violates New York State’s General 
Municipal Law, which requires the IDA to remit PILOTs to the affected tax 
jurisdictions within thirty days of receipt.205  Therefore, an unlawful 
delegation of authority challenge to the Mayor’s appropriation of PILOTs 
could arise in a New York court.206
d. Risks Shared by PILOT Financing and TIF 
 
The Far West Side’s PILOT financing and TIF are both billed as self-
financing development mechanisms.207  As shown above (in relation to 
TIF), several risks accompany projects that claim to be self-financing.208  
These risks apply with equal force to projects backed by PILOT 
financing.209
 
 203. See, e.g., PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 
 
181. 
 204. Press Release, N.Y. City Council, Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation to Stop 
Mayor’s Slush Fund Financing of Stadium (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation].  Section 227 of the City Charter specifically 
provides that: 
[n]o money, except for grants or gifts from private entities, shall be paid from any 
fund under the management of the city, or any fund under the management of any 
agency or officer of the city, or any other entity, the majority of the members of 
whose board are city officials or are appointed directly or indirectly by city 
officials, except in pursuance of an appropriation by the council or other specific 
legal authorization. 
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 227.  The Administration has not pointed to any “specific legal 
authorization” for the Mayor’s claimed power to spend PILOT funds.  Bonnie Brower, 
Testimony at the Public Hearing of the N.Y. City Council Comm. on Finance on Proposed 
Introduction No. 584-2005 (March 22, 2005) (on file with author).  Brower is the Executive 
Director of City Project, a non-partisan public policy organization whose mission is to 
advocate for fair fiscal policies in New York City. 
 205. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 874 (McKinney 2005). 
 206. In an attempt to rectify the situation, the City Council approved new legislation on 
May 11, 2005 that requires City Council approval for all future PILOT appropriations.  See 
PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181; Frank Lombardi, Council Bars 
Mayor from Stadium Aid, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 12, 2005.  The new law also requires the 
Mayor to file monthly reports with the City Council on the collection and use of PILOTs.  
See PROPOSED INTRODUCTION NO. 584-2005, supra note 181. 
 207. See supra note 191. 
 208. See supra Part III (describing the risks of TIF). 
 209. Neil deMause, Remarks at Tax Increment Financing Coming to the Big Apple? 
(Mar. 12, 2003), at http://www.goodjobsny.org/tif.htm [hereinafter deMause, Remarks]. 
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i. Impact of PILOT Debt on the Underlying Municipality 
PILOT debt, like TIF debt, is not backed by the faith and credit of the 
underlying municipality.210  Rather, PILOT bonds are secured by an 
uncertain future revenue stream.  To compensate bondholders for accepting 
this uncertainty, PILOT bonds, like TIF bonds, are likely to carry a higher 
interest rate than general obligation bonds.211
Although the HYIC will incur debt service costs on the PILOT debt 
beginning in 2005, the West Side development is not expected to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover these costs until approximately 2018.
 
 212  The 
Far West Side plan, acknowledging this discrepancy, authorizes the City 
Council to appropriate money from the City’s capital budget to make 
interest payments.213  But, the City Council is not obligated to appropriate 
City funds, and “bondholders will have no claim against the City should the 
City Council choose not to make these payments.”214
Even though bondholders will have no legal claim against the City,
 
 215
 
 210. See DEVINE, PRIMER, supra note 
 
the rating agencies may regard the HYIC’s PILOT debt as City debt.  As 
shown above, the rating agencies often see a link between a municipality 
23, at 2 (noting that TIF debt is not backed by the 
faith and credit of the underlying municipality); PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, 
supra note 168 (noting that, with the PILOT-backed bonds issued by the HYIC, 
“bondholders will have no claim against the City”). 
 211. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that that West Side’s 
PILOT-backed bonds will carry an interest rate 0.5% above the City’s general obligation 
debt); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that TIF debt generally 
warrants a higher interest rate than general obligation debt). 
 212. HUDSON YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168. 
 213. PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-2005, supra note 168.  This use of City funds 
is subject to annual City Council approval.  Id. 
 214. Under the Bloomberg Administration’s original plan, introduced in February 2004, 
early interest payments would not be paid out of the City’s general fund.  Instead, the HYIC 
would repeatedly issue commercial paper (CP) to provide the needed revenue.  HUDSON 
YARDS PRESENTATION, supra note 168.  The HYIC would borrow $4.1 billion, which 
exceeds the anticipated project costs by $1.3 billion.  PRECONSIDERED RESOLUTION NO. 760-
2005, supra note 168.  Of the $1.3 billion in additional borrowing, $948 million consisted of 
the additional borrowing (in the form of CP) needed to make the interest payments on the 
long-term debt.  Id.  In 2020, when project revenues were sufficient to cover the debt service 
on the long-term bonds, the HYIC would issue roughly $1 billion in twenty-five- year bonds 
and use the proceeds to repurchase the outstanding CP.  Id.  In response to the City 
Council’s concerns about the costs of the original proposal, the Bloomberg Administration 
agreed to alter the plan.  Now, early interest payments may come from the City’s general 
fund, subject to appropriation by the City Council.  Id.  By eliminating the ongoing issuance 
of CP and instead using the City’s general fund to pay the interest, the HYIC will only need 
to borrow approximately $3 billion rather than the originally proposed $4.1 billion.  Id.  
Moreover, the City Council anticipates that the revised plan will result in a more favorable 
credit rating for the debt.  Miller and Council Members, supra note 1. 
 215. See supra note 214. 
CERCIELLOCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:07 PM 
2005 PILOT FINANCING 131 
and its redevelopment agencies.216  As such, non-repayment of the HYIC’s 
PILOT bonds could endanger the City’s credit rating and its strong 
borrowing position.217  The Office of the State Comptroller warned that the 
HYIC debt “may be perceived by the financial community as a moral 
obligation of the City of New York and could adversely affect the city’s 
credit rating.”218  To preserve its own debt rating, the City likely would bail 
out the PILOT bonds to prevent a default.  According to California TIF 
expert Howard Greenwich, if the HYIC defaults on the bonds, “the city 
will have a hard time ever selling bonds again, so they’ll do whatever they 
can to prevent that from happening.”219
ii. Revenue Shortfalls and Cost Overruns 
 
As with TIF, if the anticipated revenues do not materialize in the 
magnitude or timeframe projected by the City then the City likely will do 
whatever it can to prevent a default.220
According to the Far West Side plan, private developers will construct 
24 million square feet of office space, 12.6 million square feet of 
residential space, 960,000 square feet of hotel space, and 680,000 square 
feet of retail space in the Hudson Yards by 2035.
 
221  The Office of the State 
Comptroller described this plan as “ambitious.”222  If the Far West Side 
project does not attract the anticipated level of private development, then 
PILOT revenues could fall short of projections.  Critics of the Far West 
Side project warn that the Bloomberg Administration is “overly optimistic” 
about the need for new office buildings.223
 
 216. See supra notes 
  Similarly, the New York City 
110-112 and accompanying text. 
 217. See DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 9; Bagli, Risky Effort, supra note 191 
(quoting Richard Ravitch, former chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, as 
saying “to suggest that a default wouldn’t affect the credit of the city is silly”). 
 218. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, REVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY’S FINANCIAL PLAN 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2008 51 (July 2004), at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/osdc/rpt5-2005.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL PLAN]. 
 219. deMause, Scrounging, supra note 17. 
 220. See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text. 
 221. New York City Announces Lead Underwriters, supra note 1.  The development plan 
initially called for twenty-six million square feet of office space, but on January 11, 2005, 
the Bloomberg Administration agreed to reduce it to twenty-four million square feet.  See, 
e.g., Charles V. Bagli & Mike McIntire, Mayor and Council Reach Deal on West Side 
Development, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at B1; Jill Gardiner, Deal is Struck on West Side 
Development, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 11, 2005, at 1. 
 222. FINANCIAL PLAN, supra note 218, at 49. 
 223. Bagli, Risky Effort, supra note 191; see also THERESA J. DEVINE, N.Y. CITY INDEP. 
BUDGET OFFICE, SUPPLY AND DEMAND: CITY & STATE MAY BE PLANNING TOO MUCH 
OFFICE SPACE 1 (2004), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us [hereinafter DEVINE, TOO MUCH].  
According to Betsy Gotbaum, Public Advocate for the City of New York, “[i]f 26 million 
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Independent Budget Office (“IBO”) determined that the City currently has 
a surplus of office space.224  In addition to existing space, an additional 14 
million square feet is currently under construction.225  This includes 7.4 
million in Midtown, 1.7 million in Lower Manhattan, 2.2 million in the 
other boroughs, and 2.5 million in Northern New Jersey.226  These 
locations could absorb demand for private development in the Far West 
Side.227  With substantial space already available and even more space on 
the way, private developers may choose not to build in the Far West Side, 
or to build more slowly than anticipated.228
Other factors besides the current surplus of office space could cause 
private development to fall short of projected levels.  For example, a 
private developer may not want to commit to developing in the Far West 
Side until future tenants have signed leases for the new space.  In turn, 
potential tenants may wait to make a commitment until the Javits Center 
expansion is complete, to determine how that project will impact the 
neighborhood.
 
229  Potential tenants also may wait until the Number Seven 
subway line is fully operational.230
As with TIF projects, the success of the Far West Side development will 
depend largely on the accuracy of the projections used.
  Thus, construction delays could 
significantly impact the level of private development. 
231
iii. Cost Spillovers 
  Inaccurate 
projections could leave the HYIC with insufficient revenue to service and 
repay the project debt, which likely would prompt the City to raise taxes or 
take money from its general fund to cover any shortfall. 
PILOT projects, like TIF projects, are likely to generate increased 
 
square feet of office space are not filled, the financing for the plan will collapse like a house 
of cards.”  Betsy Gotbaum, Remarks at the New York City Council Hearing on the West 
Side Financing Plan (Dec. 15, 2004), at 
http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/news/releases_12_15_04.html. 
 224. DEVINE, TOO MUCH, supra note 223, at 4.  The IBO concluded that the Far West 
Side plan provides for more office space than the City needs.  Id. 
 225. See REG’L PLAN ASS’N, THE FAR WEST SIDE & THE REGION’S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
NEEDS 5 (2004), at http://www.rpa.org/pdf/RPA_FWS_PAPER.pdf. 
 226. Id. 
 227. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 10. 
 228. DEVINE, TOO MUCH, supra note 223, at 1. 
 229. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11; see also supra note 2 for a discussion 
of the proposed Javits Center expansion. 
 230. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11. 
 231. Id. at 9 (“The success of the proposed revenue plan will hinge critically on the 
accuracy of the development projections used as its basis.”). 
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demand for city services.232  The new development on the Far West Side 
will bring more employees, residents, and visitors to the area.233  To 
accommodate these newcomers, the Department of City Planning and the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority have determined that, at a 
minimum, the City will require a new firehouse, a new school, and possibly 
a new daycare center.234  Yet, the funding plan does not take the cost of 
these new facilities into account.235  And even if the project generates 
revenue in excess of what is needed to service the debt, the excess may not 
be available to pay for these facilities, because the HYIC is not obligated to 
transfer the excess to the City’s general fund.236
iv. Lack of Voter Accountability 
  Thus, to pay for these new 
facilities, the City likely will have to increase taxes or withdraw existing 
taxes.  As a result, taxpayers may wind up subsidizing the development. 
The Far West Side project, like many TIF projects, allows the local 
government to act without any meaningful accountability to voters.  Some 
accountability does exist, in that Mayor Bloomberg plans to run for re-
election and thus has some incentive to act in voters’ best interests.237  This 
accountability, however, is very limited.  Mayor Bloomberg unilaterally 
determined that the HYIC debt will be repaid from PILOT revenue rather 
than from the City’s budget.238  In so doing, the Mayor sidestepped the 
normal budget approval process, as the City Council (which is composed of 
elected officials) is supposed to have final budget approval powers.  
According to New York City Council Member Joel Rivera, “[t]he Mayor 
has successfully circumvented the formal budget process, which denies 
people the right to a transparent government.”239
Furthermore, as is often the case with TIF agencies,
 
240 the HYIC 
officials will be appointed rather than elected by voters. 241
 
 232. For a discussion of the cost spillovers that may arise with TIF projects, see supra 
notes 
  This means that 
127-132 and accompanying text. 
 233. DEVINE, COMPLEX STORY, supra note 2, at 11. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. E.g., Andrew Jacobs, Bloomberg Claims a Victory in Battling Homelessness, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2005, at B4 (noting that Mayor Bloomberg is campaigning for re-election). 
 238. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text. 
 239. Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation, supra note 204. 
 240. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Miller and Council Members, supra note 1.  Some officials will be appointed 
solely by the Mayor, while others will be appointed by the City Council Speaker, City 
Comptroller, Manhattan Borough President, local Council Members and the local 
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voters cannot even express their disapproval of the financing plan by voting 
against HYIC officials in future elections. 
4. Critique and Recommendations 
The Far West Side development is billed as a self-financing project,242 
but, as with TIF, revenue shortfalls and cost overruns may occur, 
prompting the City to raise taxes or divert money from its general fund.  
The sheer magnitude of the Far West Side development increases the 
likelihood that something will go wrong and the City will have to step in.  
Most TIF bond issues are small, with an average issue size of roughly $6 
million.243  The two uses of TIF in New York involved bond issues of $8 
million and $770,000.244  In contrast, the HYIC plans to issue almost $3 
billion in TIF-like debt, which is ten times the size of the largest 
preexisting TIF bond issue on record.245
The Far West Side financing plan has raised controversy because of its 
lack of transparency and accountability.  The Mayor should not have 
unilateral discretion over the use of PILOT funds.  Instead, determining 
how PILOT funds will be used should be part of the City’s budget process.  
This would give taxpayers more of a voice in how their tax dollars are 
used.
 
246  When describing the Mayor’s use of PILOTs for the Far West 
Side project, Council Member Oliver Koppell remarked that, “[t]he 
expenditure of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars without the 
approval of the legislature is a violation of basic democratic principals and 
assertion of an imperial mayoralty.”247  On May 11, 2005, however, the 
City Council passed a law that requires Council approval for all future 
PILOT appropriations.248  The new law also requires the Mayor to file 
monthly reports regarding the collection and use of PILOTs.249
If, as the Bloomberg Administration argues, the development of the Far 
West Side is so critical to the City’s economic future, then perhaps the 
public improvements should be funded out of the City’s capital budget.  
  This law is 
a step in the right direction. 
 
Community Board.  Id. 
 242. See supra note 191. 
 243. Johnson, supra note 103, at 4.  No TIF issue has exceeded $1 billion thus far.  
McDonald, IBO Leery, supra note 173, at 1. 
 244. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
 245. deMause, Remarks, supra note 209. 
 246. Speaker Miller Introduces Legislation, supra note 204.  Taxpayers do already have 
some voice, in that they elect the mayor. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See supra note 206. 
 249. See supra note 206. 
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Funding a project through the capital budget gives taxpayers indirect 
power, because the City Council has final budget approval powers (and 
City Council members are elected by the voting public).  The City likely 
could find room in its budget to finance the Far West Side development.  In 
a March 2005 report, the IBO indicated that the City will end fiscal year 
2005 with the largest budget surplus since 2001.250  According to IBO 
Director Ronnie Lowenstein, this means that “there are some additional 
resources to work with.”251
Another alternative would be for the City to use the pay-as-you-go 
approach.  Under this approach, private developers obtain their own 
funding and front the costs.
 
252  The City would then repay the developers 
out of the incremental tax revenue generated if and when the development 
occurs.253  The developer, rather than the municipality, bears the risk that 
the development will not generate enough revenue to cover the project 
costs.254  This approach better protects taxpayers from local tax 
increases.255  At the very least, the City should negotiate firm commitments 
with private developers before making the public improvements.256
CONCLUSION 
 
The use of PILOT financing, like the use of TIF, raises the question of 
who pays for the development.  Although on their face both TIF and 
PILOT financing may seem like self-funding mechanisms, in reality this 
designation is misplaced.  If the tax revenue does not materialize as 
planned, then the underlying municipality likely will increase taxes or take 
money from its general fund to prevent a debt rating downgrade.  
Moreover, taxpayers directly subsidize these projects by paying for the 
municipal services required by the new development.  Because taxpayers 
are the ultimate repayers of the debt should the project fail, it does not seem 
right that the decision to use either TIF or PILOTs can be made without 
taxpayer input.  Local officials should not be swayed by the argument that 
TIF and PILOT projects are self-financing.  Instead, before implementing a 
project backed by either TIF or PILOT bonds, local officials must carefully 
 
 250. N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE MAYOR’S PRELIMINARY 
BUDGET FOR 2006 3 (2005), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us. 
 251. Nicholas Confessore, Larger Surplus in City’s Budget is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 4, 2005, at B1. 
 252. See, e.g., Man, supra note 18, at 93; Reinert, supra note 25, at 1028. 
 253. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1028. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Man, supra note 18, at 93. 
 256. See Kemanski, supra note 114, at 26. 
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consider whether such a project really is in the taxpayers’ best interest. 
 
